Trump Tariffs: Minerals Push Fails to Loosen China Grip
The trump tariffs strategy that President Donald Trump carries into his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this week has a hole in it, and it is made of rock. A central plank of the president's trade policy — building an American supply of the critical minerals that power semiconductors, weapons systems, robots and the artificial intelligence boom — remains unfinished, with many of the mining and refining projects meant to free the United States from dependence on Beijing still years away from producing anything at all. That leaves Trump walking into the most consequential trade negotiation of his second term with his leverage limited by the very dependence he set out to end, and with the clock running on a trade truce that expires in January.
The scale of the gap is stark. Despite billions of dollars in federal investment, American manufacturers still rely on Chinese materials for the metals, magnets and chemical compounds that modern industry cannot function without, according to half a dozen analysts interviewed by Reuters. The United States produces only a fraction of what it consumes. Its manufacturing capacity for neodymium-iron-boron magnets — the powerful permanent magnets used in electric vehicles and military equipment — stood at roughly 4,500 metric tons a year in 2025, according to the International Energy Agency. China's capacity was about 210,000 metric tons, nearly fifty times as much. The meeting with Xi, expected on Thursday, will test Trump's approach while that work is unfinished.
The leverage problem: China holds the cards
China's grip on critical minerals is the result of a deliberate, decades-long industrial strategy, and it is the reason Xi arrives at the table holding the stronger hand. China is the world's top rare earths miner, accounting for roughly 70 percent of global extraction and about 90 percent of processing, according to figures from the United States Geological Survey. The United States mined about 51,000 metric tons of rare earths in 2025, a distant second to China's 270,000 tons, and 71 percent of American rare earth imports that year came from China. The imbalance runs deeper for the magnet materials that matter most: the International Energy Agency found that China mined 60 percent of the world's magnet rare earths, refined 91 percent and made 94 percent of its sintered neodymium magnets.
That dominance gives Beijing a lever it has already pulled. Last year, China restricted exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, disrupting work at Ford Motor and other American manufacturers, and Washington had to negotiate for continued access. "The Chinese have been using the critical minerals choke collar on the US when they feel like it," Rich Nolan, the head of the National Mining Association trade group, told Reuters. Beijing has framed its controls as a matter of national security, saying it restricted the minerals to prevent their use in war, and it has accused Washington of abusing export controls of its own by blocking semiconductor exports to China. The White House did not respond to a request for comment on the state of the minerals strategy ahead of the Xi meeting.
How China built its grip: decades of processing power
To understand why the United States cannot simply mine its way out of the problem, it helps to know where the minerals go after they are dug up. The United States has exactly one active rare earth mine, Mountain Pass in California, a deposit that once supplied most of the world's rare earths, from the 1960s until the mid-1990s. As Chinese production grew and prices fell, the mine closed in 2002. It reopened in 2017, but for years most of what it dug up was shipped to China for processing, because the refineries that turn raw ore into usable material no longer existed in the United States.
That is the heart of the problem, and the part of the supply chain that takes longest to rebuild. Mining the ore is the easy step. Separating the seventeen rare earth elements from one another, refining them into oxides and metals, and turning those metals into finished magnets requires hundreds of stages of chemical processing, specialised equipment and technical knowledge that takes years to accumulate. China spent decades building that capacity across dozens of state-supported facilities, while accepting environmental and social costs that no Western democracy would tolerate. The result is an industrial fortress: even ore mined in the United States or Australia has historically been sent to China for processing, because the refining infrastructure does not exist at scale anywhere else.
The choke point is sharpest for the heavy rare earths, dysprosium and terbium, the additives that let high-performance magnets keep working at extreme temperatures. They are indispensable in F-35 fighter jets, in electric vehicle motors and in wind turbines, and China controls roughly 90 percent of their production and about 99 percent of their processing capacity. Building a new, integrated mine-to-magnet supply chain takes ten to fifteen years, according to analysts who study the sector, and that timeline is the single most important fact about the Trump administration's minerals push. "Where are we now? Exactly where the Chinese want us: screwed up beyond belief," Jack Lifton, an analyst with Technology Metals Research, told Reuters. The industry the United States nearly abandoned at the end of the twentieth century, as Samir Kapadia, head of trade at the Washington advisory firm Vogel Group, put it, cannot be rebuilt in a single presidential term.
The slow pipeline: projects years from production
The Trump administration has moved to accelerate mineral projects, and the money is real. Billions of dollars in federal investment have flowed into mining, refining and magnet manufacturing, and the Pentagon has partnered with American producers to build domestic capacity. But the calendar is unforgiving: mines, refineries and processing facilities require a decade or more to come online, and the flagship projects now under way will not deliver material until the end of the decade or beyond. "Right now there are more PowerPoint decks than permits, so the question is how many of these projects exist only in PDF form and how many are shovel-ready," Kapadia told Reuters.
The project list reads like a catalogue of distant dates. A 7.4 billion dollar refinery for copper, zinc and other critical minerals in Tennessee, backed by South Korea's Korea Zinc, is not expected to open until 2030. Rio Tinto and BHP aim to build North America's largest copper mine, but it would not open until next decade. Last year, the Trump administration agreed to take an equity stake in Trilogy Metals, which plans to produce copper in Alaska starting in 2031. These are serious, well-funded projects, but none of them helps an American manufacturer that needs magnets or refined metals this year, and none of them changes the balance of power in the room when Trump sits down with Xi on Thursday.
Some projects are further along, and they show what the end of the pipeline could eventually look like. Vulcan Elements has begun making rare earth magnets in North Carolina, although its customers have not yet approved them for use. MP Materials, the company that operates Mountain Pass, is expanding magnet production in Texas under a multibillion-dollar partnership with the Pentagon. In Nevada, the Thacker Pass mine — North America's largest lithium source — is under construction by Lithium Americas, with production expected in 2028. Perpetua Resources plans to produce antimony, used to make bullets and armour, in Idaho by 2029. Each of these is a genuine step toward an American supply chain. Added together, though, they still amount to a fraction of what China already produces, and they arrive years after the moment when American leverage is most needed.
What the Xi meeting could decide
Against that backdrop, the meeting with Xi is less a victory lap than a negotiation over time. The existing trade truce between the two countries is due to expire in January, and it includes export-control waivers for certain critical minerals — the mechanism that has kept American factories supplied since last year's disruption. Trump and Xi may agree to extend the truce, the most likely outcome — but it would also be an admission that replacing Chinese supply with American supply has not yet worked. Every extension buys months for American projects to advance, and confirms that Washington still needs Beijing's cooperation to keep its own factories running.
The tariff question sits at the centre of that calculation. Tariffs have been Trump's preferred instrument for reshaping trade, and the threat of higher duties on Chinese goods is his most visible source of pressure. But tariffs do not conjure American minerals into existence, and pressing Xi too hard risks a new round of Chinese restrictions — the Ford disruption of last year showed how quickly that pain arrives. The tariffs impact on prices is felt well beyond the negotiating table: when a key input is controlled by a single supplier, every disruption ripples through American car plants, electronics factories and defence contractors, and the cost lands on consumers and workers. A deal that keeps the minerals flowing matters more, in the short term, than a deal that scores points on tariffs.
The politics at home: oversight after the midterms
Trump's minerals strategy also faces a political test at home, and it arrives at an awkward moment. The Democrats' victories in the midterm elections 2026 will give them control of Congress next year, and some Democrats have questioned the administration's investments in private companies, including the equity stakes and partnerships that form the backbone of the minerals push. Supporters say the government must step in where private capital will not, because the market alone never built a rare earths industry outside China; critics say public money should not be picking winners, taking stakes and guaranteeing prices for private firms.
Energy Secretary Chris Wright, whose department funded multiple minerals projects, said last week that he is "happy to explain everything we've done," a signal that the administration expects scrutiny and intends to defend the programme on its merits. That defence will have to answer the question the Reuters reporting raises most sharply: not whether the money was spent, but whether it is producing results fast enough to matter. The projects funded so far are real, and the pipeline they form is the most serious American attempt to rebuild the industry in a generation. But the results are measured in opening dates — 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031 — and the negotiation with Xi is happening now. A Democratic Congress will have subpoena power and oversight hearings, and the administration's industrial investments will be examined in public, at the same time as the president is asking Beijing for more time.
What happens next
The immediate question is what Trump and Xi agree on Thursday. An extension of the trade truce, with its export-control waivers for critical minerals, would keep American factories supplied and give the administration's projects more time to come online. A failure to extend it would raise the risk of renewed Chinese restrictions and renewed disruption, and it would test whether the administration has any fallback for manufacturers that cannot wait until 2028 or 2030 for American supply. The White House has not said what it will ask for, and it did not respond to questions about the minerals strategy before the meeting.
Beyond the summit, the test is whether the pipeline of American projects starts producing on schedule. Thacker Pass is due in 2028, Perpetua's antimony in 2029, the Tennessee refinery in 2030, Trilogy's Alaska copper in 2031 — and each of those dates will be watched as a measure of whether the billions in federal investment are turning into metal. The magnet gap, 4,500 tons against 210,000, will not close in a year, and it may not close in a decade. But the direction of travel matters, and so does the pace: every year that passes without American production is another year in which Beijing's leverage holds. Trump set out to break China's grip on the materials that power the modern economy, and the effort is real, funded and under way. But the grip is built on decades of capacity that cannot be recreated quickly, and when the president sits down with Xi this week, he will be negotiating not from the position he hoped to build, but from the position he inherited — dependent, exposed, and asking for time.
Source: Reuters